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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

JANUARY 31, 1985

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
TO THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

31 JANUARY 1985

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND GOALS. LET ME FIRST COMMEND THIS COMMITTEE FOR CONVENING THESE HEARINGS TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. IN ANY NATION FOUNDED ON THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, THE BACKING OF AN INFORMED PEOPLE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE LONG-TERM SUCCESS OF OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO KEEP THE PUBLIC SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR THE INVESTMENTS WE MUST MAKE TO SECURE STRONG DEFENSES. SO, BY WORKING TO FORGE A GREATER NATIONAL CONSENSUS, YOUR COMMITTEE HELPS BOLSTER THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT WHICH, IN COMBINATION WITH OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES, FORMS THE BASIS FOR OUR NATIONAL STRENGTH.

THE STRONGEST FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD A CONSENSUS ON FOREIGN POLICY IS THE AMERICAN CHARACTER -- OUR VALUES, OUR TRAITS, OUR SPIRIT. AS YOU REVIEW THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY, I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND THAT IT DOES INDEED REFLECT THE BEST OF OUR AMERICAN CHARACTER, IN PARTICULAR OUR CONTINUING QUEST FOR PEACE WITH FREEDOM.

AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND DEFENSE POLICIES SUPPORT OUR OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY BY SAFEGUARDING OUR NATION AND PRESERVING OUR VITAL INTERESTS. OUR BASIC NATIONAL

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INTERESTS HAVE REMAINED CONSTANT DURING THE POST-WAR PERIOD. BROADLY SPEAKING, WE SEEK TO SURVIVE AS A NATION, TO BE FREE TO PURSUE OUR WAY OF LIFE, TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, AND TO LIVE IN A STABLE AND PEACEFUL WORLD.

CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S INTERESTS

IF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS HAVE REMAINED UNCHANGED, SO TOO HAS THE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO THESE INTERESTS POSED BY THE AIMS AND AMBITIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE MILITARY POWER THAT GIVES THEM FORCE.

PEOPLE WHOSE BUSINESS IS NEWS NATURALLY ENJOY SPECULATING ABOUT HOW DRAMATICALLY OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE CHANGING AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THEY LIKE TO TAKE ITS TEMPERATURE ON A DAILY BASIS AND PRONOUNCE CHILLS OR THAWS, NEW ERAS OF COLD WAR OR DETENTE.

BUT THIS COMMITTEE HAS DELIBERATELY AND PROPERLY CHOSEN TO LOOK AWAY FROM TODAY'S HEADLINES TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES -- AND ENDURING DILEMMAS -- OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. AS YOU LOOK, I THINK YOU WILL SEE THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN CONSTANT, OR CHANGED VERY SLOWLY, IN THE POSTWAR YEARS.

SOVIET REPRESSION HAS BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED, BUT LIFE HAS NOT, AS STALIN ONCE PROMISED, BECOME "BETTER AND GAYER" FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMBITION OF SOVIET LEADERS TO EXTEND THE SWAY OF MARXISM-LENINISM, IF

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LACKING IN TRUE IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR, IS NEVERTHELESS TODAY SUPPORTED BY TREMENDOUS MILITARY POWER. THE 1977 BREZHNEV CONSTITUTION REITERATES THAT IT IS SOVIET RUSSIA'S AIM, INDEED DUTY, TO SPREAD THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM TO ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. AND THIS LONG-HELD DOCTRINE OF SOVIET DOMINATION IS BACKED UP BY THE FULL FORCE OF THE RED ARMY. THE PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ANGOLA, CAMBODIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND POLAND CAN BEAR ELOQUENT WITNESS TO THE SOVIETS' WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY THROUGH PROXIES, AND USE IT MERCILESSLY.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS NOT SHRUNK FROM STATING THE TRUTH ABOUT THESE HARSH REALITIES OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR. AT THE SAME TIME HE HAS ACTIVELY SOUGHT OUT NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION, AND LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR A REALISTIC, LONG-TERM, PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT WE CAN BE BUSINESS-LIKE WITHOUT BEING MORALLY BLIND, VIGILANT WITHOUT BEING BELLIGERENT -- AND THAT WE CAN NEGOTIATE WITHOUT SURRENDERING OUR PRINCIPLES OR OUR INTERESTS.

ABOVE ALL, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS REFUSED TO SHUT HIS EYES TO THE FRUITS OF AN AMBITIOUS AND SUSTAINED SOVIET PROGRAM OF MILITARY INVESTMENT. COUPLED WITH U.S. RESTRAINT DURING THE 1970's, THIS EXPANDING MILITARY POWER ENABLED MOSCOW TO SHIFT CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF THE OVERALL GLOBAL MILITARY BALANCE IN ITS FAVOR. WHILE BUILDING ON THEIR SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS, THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO DRAMATICALLY IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF

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THEIR MILITARY SYSTEMS AND CLOSING THE WEST'S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE. WE ARE IN THE TWELFTH YEAR OF DEBATE OVER THE MX MISSILE, AND WHILE WE DEBATE, THE SOVIETS DEPLOY. THEY CONTINUE TO TEST AND FIELD NEW AND MORE ACCURATE MISSILES AND TO IMPROVE ALL THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. AND SINCE THE MID-70'S, THE SOVIETS HAVE WIDENED THEIR CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE IN NEARLY EVERY FORCE CATEGORY BY PRODUCING MAJOR WEAPONS AT RATES MUCH GREATER THAN THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR NATO ALLIES COMBINED.

TO EXERT ITS MILITARY POWER AROUND THE WORLD, THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO EXPANDING THE GEOGRAPHIC REACH OF ITS FORCES. WE HAVE SEEN GROWTH IN SOVIET AIRLIFT, THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG BLUE-WATER NAVY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSEAS BASES, AND THE OPPORTUNISTIC EXPANSION OF SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE WORLDWIDE. TODAY THE SOVIETS HAVE BASES AND PORTS NEAR THE WORLD'S MAJOR TRADE ROUTES AND ENERGY RESOURCES, THREATENING U.S. INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

FURTHER COMPLICATING AMERICA'S SECURITY CHALLENGE IS THE INCREASED POLITICAL TURMOIL AND THE RISE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN MANY REGIONS OF THE WORLD. THE SOVIETS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO EXPLOIT THAT TURMOIL WHEN IT ADVANCES THEIR GOALS.

A STRATEGY TO PROTECT AMERICA'S INTERESTS

WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE AN OFFENSIVE-ORIENTED STRATEGY, THE UNITED STATES HAS A DEFENSIVE STRATEGY THAT REFLECTS OUR

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VALUES AS A NATION. LET US PAUSE HERE, AND THINK ABOUT THE TREMENDOUS BURDEN THIS PUTS ON AMERICAN STRATEGY. AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE I AM OFTEN ASKED TO EXPLAIN U.S. STRATEGY. NOT INFREQUENTLY, IT TURNS OUT THAT I AM REALLY BEING ASKED FOR AN EXPLICIT ACCOUNT OF JUST WHERE, WHEN, AND HOW WE WOULD USE OUR MILITARY POWER UNDER ANY AND ALL CONCEIVABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. AND IF THE QUESTIONER DOES NOT HEAR EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTS TO HEAR, HE WILL REPORT THAT OUR STRATEGY IS "INCOHERENT."

BUT "COHERENT" PLANS FOR FIRST USES OF MILITARY FORCES ARE THE LUXURY OF AGGRESSORS. IT IS THE FATE OF DEFENDERS THAT WE CANNOT CHOOSE THE TIME, PLACE, AND METHOD OF ATTACK. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDERS TO BE PREPARED TO MEET A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES FROM TERRORISM TO GLOBAL CONFLICT. OUR POSITION AS A DEFENSIVE NATION NECESSARILY MEANS THAT WE MUST LIVE WITH AN ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY IN OUR MILITARY STRATEGY.

SINCE WE DO NOT SEEK TERRITORIAL GAINS FROM THE USE OF MILITARY POWER, WE MAINTAIN OUR FORCES IN A REACTIVE POSTURE. WE WILL USE OUR MILITARY FORCES ONLY IN RESPONSE TO CLEAR THREATS TO OUR SECURITY AND INTERESTS. AND WHEN THOSE THREATS CAN COME FROM MANY QUARTERS, AS IS THE CASE WITH THE SOVIETS' WIDELY DISPERSED FORCES AND STRENGTH, OUR DEFENSIVE FORCES MUST BE STRONG AND CAPABLE OF RESPONDING IN MORE THAN ONE AREA, PERHAPS SIMULTANEOUSLY. ONLY IF WE HAVE THIS STRENGTH WILL WE BE ABLE TO DETER ATTACK FROM A WORLDWIDE MILITARY POWER AS STRONG AS THE USSR. MOREOVER, WE SEEK TO

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REDUCE THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT -- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL -- BEFORE THEY LEAD TO ARMED COMBAT. OUR GOAL IS TO DETER, NOT FIGHT. BUT IF DETERRENCE FAILS WE MUST STILL BE READY AND ABLE TO DEFEND OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES.

THE KEYSTONE OF OUR MILITARY STRATEGY SINCE WORLD WAR II HAS BEEN DETERRENCE. DETERRENCE PROVIDES SECURITY BY CONVINCING POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES THAT THE RISKS AND COSTS OF AGGRESSION WILL EXCEED ANY CONCEIVABLE GAINS. THE U.S. SEEKS CREDIBLE DETERRENCE THROUGH OUR MILITARY STRENGTH, POLITICAL RESOLVE, AND DIPLOMACY. OUR MILITARY STRENGTH AND STRATEGY DETER BY MAKING A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR'S ASSESSMENTS OF WAR OUTCOMES SO UNCERTAIN AND DANGEROUS THAT ANY INCENTIVE FOR ATTACKING IS REMOVED. A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR WOULD FACE, AND KNOW HE FACES, THE POSSIBILITY OF THREE TYPES OF RESPONSES THAT ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED.

FIRST, DEFENSE: IF WE HAVE A ROBUST MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION, THEN A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY WOULD REALIZE THAT HIS AGGRESSION WOULD FAIL ON ITS OWN TERMS. FACING SUCH A CREDIBLE DEFENSE, HE SHOULD BE DETERRED.

SECOND, ADEQUATE RESPONSE: AN ADVERSARY MUST KNOW THAT EVEN IF HIS AGGRESSION SHOULD SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING ITS IMMEDIATE TARGET, AN ATTACK ON OUR VITAL INTERESTS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY US WITHOUT RESPONSE, WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE ESCALATION. THE AGGRESSOR WILL KNOW THAT, EVEN IF HE WINS THE BATTLE, HE MUST FACE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HE WILL LOSE THE WAR.

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THIRD, RETALIATION: IF AN ADVERSARY CONFRONTS A CREDIBLE THREAT THAT HIS AGGRESSION WILL TRIGGER A RESPONSE THAT IMPOSES LOSSES EXCEEDING ANY POSSIBLE GAINS, THEN HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE CAN GAIN NOTHING FROM AN ATTACK.

OF THESE THREE SOURCES OF DETERRENCE THE MOST PREFERABLE AND REASSURING IS DEFENSE BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO BE MORE CREDIBLE AND BECAUSE IT PROVIDES PROTECTION SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL.

CREDIBLE AND PRUDENT DETERRENCE REQUIRES STRONG MILITARY CAPABILITY. MERE THREATS ARE NOT ENOUGH. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER DECLARED CONTINUED ACCESS TO PERSIAN GULF OIL TO BE A VITAL U.S. INTEREST, OUR ABILITY TO DETER ATTACKS IN THAT AREA, CLEARLY OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE WEST, WAS WEAK. THE UNITED STATES HAD THE CAPABILITY NEITHER TO DEFEND THE OIL FIELDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AT THE POINT OF ATTACK, NOR TO THREATEN ADEQUATE RESPONSES IN THAT THEATER. THEREFORE, A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TO STRENGTHEN OUR ABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR INTERESTS IN THAT VOLATILE AREA. WE HAVE ENHANCED AMERICAN POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES SO THAT IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONTEMPLATED THREATENING OUR INTERESTS THEY WOULD BE DETERRED BY THE PROSPECT OF AMERICAN TROOPS WHO COULD FIGHT WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AT THE POINT OF ATTACK.

SINCE I WILL BE RETURNING NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THE FY 1986 DEFENSE BUDGET WITH CONGRESS, LET ME JUST BRIEFLY EMPHASIZE TODAY HOW THE PRIORITIES OF THE REAGAN DEFENSE PROGRAM ARE

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DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR STRATEGY. I EMPHASIZE THAT EACH OF THESE PRIORITIES IS DEEMED VITAL, TO GIVE US THE STRENGTH TO DETER ATTACKS -- IN SHORT, TO BE SURE WE NEVER HAVE TO USE OUR STRONG FORCES.

- READINESS: TO MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY OF THE FORCES WE NOW HAVE, TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO AGGRESSION AT THE POINT OF ATTACK AND DEFEAT IT.
- SUSTAINABILITY: TO HAVE THE AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT TO FIGHT WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS LONG ENOUGH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT A SOVIET ATTACK COULD NEITHER ACHIEVE A BOLD FAIT ACCOMPLI OR FORCE THE PRESIDENT TO FACE THE CHOICE BETWEEN DEFEAT OR INSTANT ESCALATION.
- MOBILITY: TO ENABLE U.S. FORCES TO GET TO THE POINT OF ATTACK IN TIME AND TO BE SUPPORTED UNTIL THE ATTACK IS DEFEATED.
- CONVENTIONAL MODERNIZATION: TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF DEFEATING NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR SOVIET FORCES.
- STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION: TO ASSURE THAT WE MAINTAIN A BALANCED TRIAD OF SURVIVABLE NUCLEAR FORCES -- LAND, SEA, AND AIR -- TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT WE COULD RETALIATE TO A FIRST STRIKE, AND THEREFORE DETER SUCH AN ATTACK.

WHILE OUR ENTIRE DEFENSE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT OUR STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT UNILATERALLY PROTECT OUR WORLDWIDE INTERESTS. NOR

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CAN WE HIDE BEHIND THE ISOLATIONIST ILLUSIONS OF "FORTRESS AMERICA". WE MUST HAVE STRONG ALLIES AND FRIENDS, AND WORK CLOSELY WITH NATIONS WHO SHARE OUR GOALS. BASED ON THE STRATEGIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE PAST FOUR DECADES, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS STRENGTHENED OUR TIES WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AROUND THE WORLD IN PURSUING A STRATEGY OF GLOBAL DETERRENCE.

A STRONG SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IS INDISPENSIBLE TO HELP AMERICA AND ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS PRESERVE PEACE AND FREEDOM. COOPERATING NATIONS SHARE COMMON SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVE A DIVISION OF LABOR CAPITALIZING ON THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF EACH STATE. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO KEEP OUR ALLIANCES STRONG AND ENCOURAGE ALL PARTNERS TO SHOULDER A FAIR SHARE OF THE SECURITY BURDEN.

U.S. STRATEGY ALSO DERIVES GREAT BENEFIT FROM OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SALES PROGRAMS. THESE EFFICIENT, COMPARATIVELY LOW COST PROGRAMS HELP FRIENDLY COUNTRIES MAKE BETTER USE OF THEIR OWN OFTEN LIMITED RESOURCES, AND COPE WITH SECURITY THREATS WITHIN OR ON THEIR BORDERS. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ALSO REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD THAT U.S. FORCES WILL BE CALLED UPON TO INTERVENE IN DEFENSE OF A NATION THAT WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE CARE OF ITS OWN DEFENSE. SECRETARY SHULTZ AND I ARE IN COMPLETE ACCORD ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SALES. I HOPE THIS COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THESE ESSENTIAL TOOLS OF FOREIGN

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POLICY AND THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD AN OPEN MIND ON ALL QUESTIONS OF ARMS SALES UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE ITS PROPOSAL AND PRESENTED A RATIONALE.

U.S. STRATEGY MUST ALSO CONTINUE TO DEPEND ON OUR FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES. THE PROXIMITY OF SOVIET FORCES TO OUR ALLIES AND OVERSEAS INTERESTS IMPOSES SEVERE DEMANDS ON THE TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE, SINCE TERRITORY ONCE LOST WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REGAIN. STRONG FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES ENABLE US TO DETER MORE CREDIBLY, DEFEND MORE EFFECTIVELY, AND REASSURE OUR ALLIES MORE CONVINCINGLY. U.S. DEPLOYMENTS WORLDWIDE ARE THE VISIBLE EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE PREPARED AND COMMITTED TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS AND BACK THE POLICIES WE ESPOUSE.

ARMS REDUCTIONS

THE AMERICAN CHARACTER HAS ALWAYS DEPENDED ON THE STRENGTH OF OUR IDEALS, NOT THE USE OF FORCE, TO SPREAD OUR VISION OF A BETTER WORLD. IN THIS SPIRIT, THE UNITED STATES HAS SINCE THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR AGE WORKED FOR CONTROLS ON THESE AWESOME WEAPONS. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR NOBLE QUEST HAS YET TO SUCCEED. MORE THAN A DECADE OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS NEITHER ACHIEVED GENUINE REDUCTIONS NOR PREVENTED AN UNPRECEDENTED SOVIET BUILD-UP THAT CONTINUES TO THIS DAY. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED MAJOR ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS AND POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.

BECAUSE ARMS AGREEMENTS CAN INCREASE OUR SECURITY,

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PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS COMMITTED THIS ADMINISTRATION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FAR-REACHING, EQUITABLE, AND VERIFIABLE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS. AMERICA'S QUEST FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS PROVIDES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE OUR DETERRENCE AND ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS, WE MUST PROCEED WITH TOUGHNESS AND PATIENCE, WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT SOVIET LEADERS DO NOT SHARE THE VALUES OF OUR AMERICAN CHARACTER. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE FAILURES OF THE PAST AND THE RECORD OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT FUTURE ACCORDS BE PRECISELY DRAFTED AND VERIFIABLE TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY ALL PARTIES.

WE GO TO GENEVA WITH IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS. BUT TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS WE MUST CONTINUE OUR STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND DEMONSTRATE OUR RESOLVE TO STAY STRONG. IN FACT, IT WAS THAT RESOLVE THAT BROUGHT THE SOVIETS BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND NOW GIVES US A CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE THOSE ARMS REDUCTION GOALS THAT HAVE ELUDED MANKIND FOR FAR TOO LONG. IN THIS REGARD, I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY THAT CANCELLATION OF KEY PROGRAMS, SUCH AS MX, WILL PROLONG NEGOTIATIONS, NOT FACILITATE THEM, AND WILL REDUCE OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE ARMS REDUCTIONS.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE

EARLIER, I EMPHASIZED THE KEY ROLE OF DEFENSE IN DETERRING CONFLICT. STRONG DEFENSES CAN STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR AS WELL AS CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE. THROUGH THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE

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INITIATIVE WE SEEK TO EXPLORE A DEFENSIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL STRATEGIC DETERRENCE POLICY, WHICH HAS BEEN BASED ON MUTUAL VULNERABILITY.

IN A SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN MARCH 1983, PRESIDENT REAGAN INTRODUCED HIS VISION OF A WORLD FREED FROM THE TERROR OF NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILES. SINCE THEN WE HAVE STUDIED BOTH THE TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY AND THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF PURSUING STRATEGIC DEFENSE; AND WE CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD EMBARK ON A PROGRAM TO EXPLORE THE POTENTIAL OF ADVANCED, EMERGING DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES TO SUPPORT A THOROUGHLY RELIABLE DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILES. STRATEGIC DEFENSE CAN BOTH STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND ENHANCE OUR OPPORTUNITIES FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS. BY INCREASING SIGNIFICANTLY THE UNCERTAINTY OF SUCCESS OF A SOVIET FIRST STIKE, STRATEGIC DEFENSE WILL ENHANCE DETERRENCE. IF THE SOVIET LEADERS EVER CONTEMPLATED INITIATING A NUCLEAR ATTACK, THEIR PURPOSE WOULD BE TO DESTROY U.S. OR ALLIED MILITARY FORCES THAT WOULD BE ABLE TO OPPOSE THE AGGRESSION. EFFECTIVE DEFENSES THAT COULD DENY THE SOVIET MISSILES THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF THEIR ATTACK OR DENY THE SOVIETS CONFIDENCE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE OBJECTIVES, WOULD DISCOURAGE THEM FROM SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SUCH AN ATTACK. BUT UNLIKE OUR CURRENT APPROACH TO DETERRENCE BASED ON RETALIATION, DEFENSES WILL PERMIT US TO DETER WAR BY DESTROYING WEAPONS, NOT PEOPLE.

OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ALSO FURTHERS OUR ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS. IT IS A RESEARCH PROGRAM ENTIRELY

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CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY. WHAT BETTER WAY TO ENCOURAGE BOLD REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILES THAN BY DEVALUING THEIR MILITARY USEFULNESS. THUS, IN ADDITION TO ENHANCING DETERRENCE AND STABILITY, SDI COULD INCREASE OUR CHANCES TO ACHIEVE A SAFER WORLD THROUGH GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS.

RESTORING THE PEACE

FEW PEOPLE HAVE MORE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR A POWERFUL MILITARY HAND WITHIN THE GLOVE OF DIPLOMACY THAN PRESIDENT REAGAN. BUT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE THAT MILITARY POWER SHOULD BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT. WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO USE ALL SOURCES OF NATIONAL POWER SHORT OF DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION; YET, WE SHOULD NEVER RULE OUT THE USE OF FORCE IF DETERRENCE FAILS. THERE IS A DETERRENT VALUE IN NEVER SAYING NEVER.

THE U.S. HAS ERRED IN THE PAST BY BEING UNWILLING TO USE SUFFICIENT FORCE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES, ADHERING TO MISGUIDED NOTIONS ABOUT "GRADUAL APPLICATION OF FORCE." WHEN A LAST RESORT DECISION IS MADE TO USE FORCE, BECAUSE IT IS VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS TO DO SO, IT IS NECESSARY THAT WE USE SUFFICIENT FORCE TO WIN -- THAT IS TO ACHIEVE A CLEARLY DEFINED OBJECTIVE AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE.

IF WE EVER DECIDE TO COMMIT OUR FORCES TO COMBAT, WE MUST SUPPORT THOSE FORCES TO THE FULLEST EXTENT OF OUR NATIONAL WILL FOR AS LONG AS IT TAKES TO WIN. THAT MEANS WE MUST MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY MILITARY FORCE TO ACHIEVE A CLEARLY

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DEFINED DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVE -- THAT IS NECESSARY TO OUR VITAL INTERESTS AND WHICH CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

AS I STATED EARLIER, THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL ELEMENT OF A SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRACY IS A STRONG CONSENSUS OF SUPPORT AND AGREEMENT FOR OUR BASIC PURPOSES. FOLLOWING FROM THIS, I DEVELOPED AND EXPLAINED SIX TESTS FOR THE USES OF MILITARY POWER AROUND WHICH I HOPE PUBLIC CONSENSUS CAN BE FORGED. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THE NECESSITY OF HAVING FULL PUBLIC SUPPORT BEFORE WE USE FORCE. IT DOES MEAN THAT BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COMMITS COMBAT FORCES ABROAD THERE MUST BE SOME REASONABLE ASSURANCE WE WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS.

JUST AS WE REQUIRE PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR EMPLOYING MILITARY FORCE IN WAR, WE REQUIRE THAT SUPPORT TO BUILD THE DEFENSES NECESSARY TO PRESERVE PEACE. THAT ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SUPPORT DEPENDS ON A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGIC UNDERPINNINGS OF OUR DEFENSE PROGRAM, A SOBER AND REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CHALLENGES WE FACE, AND A VISION OF THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MORE SECURE PEACE WITH FREEDOM. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT I FULLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THIS COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE GOALS AND STRATEGIC PREMISES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AND TO BUILD A BIPARTISAN COMMITMENT TO PURSUE OUR STRATEGY FOR REALIZING THOSE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES, OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AND INDEED ALL MANKIND.